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Abstract
There exists a common view that for theories related by a ‘duality’, dual models typ-
ically may be taken ab initio to represent the same physical state of affairs, i.e. to corre-
spond to the same possible world. We question this view, by drawing a parallel with the
distinction between ‘interpretational’ and ‘motivational’ approaches to symmetries.
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The phenomenon of ‘duality’ is pervasive in contemporary theoretical physics—particularly
string theory. Roughly, two physical theories are dual when there exists an isomorphism be-
tween their spaces of dynamically possible models,1 such that models related by that isomor-
phism are empirically equivalent. According to a common view in the philosophical literature,
duality-related models typically may be construed ab initio as representing the same physical
state of affairs, i.e. as corresponding to the same possible world—in which case duality-related
1For the definition of ‘dynamically possible model’, see §2. In this paper, the term ‘model’ is understood in
the sense of the semantic conception of scientific theories—see e.g. [71, ch. 2], and §2.
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models are not only empirically equivalent, but also physically equivalent. Two motivations
for this view are often advanced:
(1) This view of dualities aligns with a general conception of the philosophical import of
symmetry transformations—namely, that models related by a symmetry transformation
typically may be understood ab initio as being physically equivalent.
(2) This view of dualities accords with a perceived consensus within the contemporary theo-
retical physics community.
In this paper, we question both (1) and (2). On (1), we deny that dual models may be
regarded as physically equivalent absent a coherent explication of the common ontology un-
derpinning this physical equivalence; and by the same token, we deny that symmetry-related
models may be regarded as physically equivalent in the absence of such an explication. Thus,
we argue for a reconstrual of the import of dualities and symmetries: dualities invariably at
most motivate one to seek an understanding of how it is that dual models are to be regarded
as physically equivalent; and by the same token, symmetries also invariably at most motivate
one to seek an understanding how it is that symmetry-related models are to be regarded as
physically equivalent. On (2), we cite a variety of evidence from the physics literature which
calls into question whether this perception of such a consensus is correct.2
The format of this paper is as follows. In §2, we recall some of the central features of
the semantic approach to scientific theories—this being the framework largely adopted in this
paper. In §3, we introduce the distinction between the ‘interpretational’ and ‘motivational’
approaches to symmetries, using Newtonian gravitation theory as an illustrative example; we
go on to defend the motivational approach.3 In §4, we present notions of ‘underdetermina-
tion’ and ‘theoretical equivalence’ which will prove useful in our subsequent discussion of
dualities in §5—in which we introduce a distinction between the interpretational and moti-
vational approaches to dualities, and (again) defend the latter approach. Finally, in §6 we
assess the extent to which the interpretational apporach—a common view in the philosophical
literature—is embraced in the theoretical physics community.
2In this regard, we follow the methodology of [7].
3In this regard, this paper may be viewed as continuous with [45], offering further reasons to endorse the
motivational approach, as well as providing an extended application of the interpretation/motivation distinction
to the case of dualities.
3
2 Models and Gauge
On the semantic conception of scientific theories—introduced by Suppes [67], and famously
endorsed by Van Fraassen [71, 72]—a theory is associated with a class of models.4,5 For a
given theory T , we take the most general class of associated models to be that of ‘kinemat-
ically possible models’ (KPMs) K, which consists in tuples of specified geometrical objects.
For example, the KPMs of general relativity (GR) are picked out by all triples of the form
〈M, gab,Φ〉,6 where M is a four-dimensional differentiable manifold;7 gab is a Lorentzian
metric field on M ; and Φ is a placeholder for the matter fields of the theory.
Classically, a theory T , with KPMs 〈M,O1, . . . On〉 (where the Oi are geometrical ob-
jects), comes with a set of dynamical equations for the Oi. The KPMs of T in which the Oi
obey those dynamical equations form a subset D ⊂ K, the ‘dynamically possible models’
(DPMs) of T . For example, in the case of GR, only those triples 〈M, gab,Φ〉 the geometrical
objects of which satisfy the Einstein field equations8
Gab = 8piTab (2.1)
—the dynamical equations of the theory, which relate gab to the stress-energy tensor Tab of the
Φ—in addition to the dynamical equations of the Φ, are DPMs.9 Quantum mechanically, the
story changes: some of the Oi in the KPMs of T are understood to be operator-valued; DPMs
4One should distinguish the claim that a given theory has an associated class of models from the (more
controversial) claim that a theory should be identified with such a class of models. In this paper, we embrace the
former, but remain agnostic on the latter.
5Van Fraassen identifies a model of a theory as “Any structure which satisfies the axioms of [that] theory” [71,
p. 53]. In the language of this paper, it is natural to identify models in Van Fraassen’s sense with dynamically
possible models (see below). Following e.g. [53, 54], we understand the notion of a model in a broader sense.
6Throughout this paper, abstract (i.e. coordinate-independent) indices are written in Latin script, and we set
GN = c = 1.
7Two points here are in order. First, one should avoid, at this stage, assertingM to be the spacetime manifold,
for to do so is to conflate the mathematical model under consideration with the possible world to which that
model is ultimately interpreted as corresponding. Second, and relatedly, in light of the debate over the hole
argument [26], it is not necessarily correct to interpret M as representing substantival spacetime at all—though
this issue will here be set aside.
8These are the Einstein field equations with vanishing cosmological constant Λ. For Λ 6= 0, the field equations
read Gab + Λgab = 8piTab.
9Strictly, independence of these dynamical equations from the Einstein field equations depends on the case in
question—see [8, §9.3] and [44, §20.6].
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are picked out as those KPMs the geometrical objects of which satisfy certain correlation
functions (for relevant aspects of the structure of quantum field theory, see e.g. [24,49,66]; for
further philosophical details regarding the above approach, see [58, ch. 5]).
Models of a theory T are interpreted as representing possible worlds. Sometimes, how-
ever, we may wish to interpret two or more distinct models as representing the same world. In
that case, the space of KPMsK of T is partitioned into classes of ‘gauge-equivalent’ models—
which are interpreted as representing the same world—and the multiplicity of models repre-
senting the same world is an example of a ‘gauge redundancy’.10 In the case in which the
interpretation of T leads to gauge redundancy, we may construct a reduced space of mod-
els K˜, in which gauge-related models are mathematically identified.11 This in turn induces a
reduced space of DPMs, D˜ ⊂ K˜.12
3 Interpretation and Motivation
3.1 Two Approaches to Symmetries
The above is purely formal; there remains an outstanding question concerning when two mod-
els of T should be interpreted as representing the same possible world. One popular line
(found—although not necessarily endorsed—in e.g. [3, 5, 11, 14, 20, 23, 29, 33, 48, 64, 80]) is
the following: two models of T typically may be regarded ab initio as representing the same
possible world when they are related by a symmetry transformation—even absent a coherent
explication of their shared ontology.13,14
10It should be stressed that the term ‘gauge redundancy’ is deployed in this paper in a broader sense than
that typically found in the physics literature, where the term is often reserved for certain ‘internal’ symmetries
associated with Yang-Mills type theories. For philosophical discussion, see e.g. [30, 74, 76].
11For a concise expression of these points in the language of category theory, see [76, 78, 79].
12One assumes that two models cannot be gauge-equivalent if they satisfy different dynamics. While one
might worry that this understanding of gauge redundancies effaces the possibility that two models with different
dynamics may correspond to the same possible world (and thereby pose problems for the interpretation of dual-
ities—see §4 below), this is not correct, for nothing in the above precludes the possibility that there exist other
relations which may allow for inter-theoretic model identification.
13Clearly, such a claim has substance only once an appropriate definition of a ‘symmetry transformation’ is
provided; this matter is addressed in detail below.
14What is meant by such an explication will be made explicit over the following subsections. This explication
must cohere both internally, and with the structure of the models under consideration (it is, therefore, insufficient
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According to this ‘interpretational’ approach [45, §2], in the presence of symmetry-related
models, we are (a) typically warranted in interpreting those models as representing the same
possible world—even absent a coherent explication of their common ontology; then may (but
are not required to) go on to (b) identify such models, to construct a reduced space of KPMs
K˜; and finally (c) seek to explicate the ontology of the models of K˜. This is in contrast with
the ‘motivational’ approach [45, §2], according to which the existence of symmetry-related
models first (a) motivates us to provide an explication of the shared ontology of these models;
but only once such an explication is forthcoming should we (b) interpret those models as
representing the same possible world; and (potentially) (c) identify those models to construct
a reduced space of KPMs, K˜.15
Why ‘typically’, in the above presentation of the interpretational view? A supporter of
this view may impose certain further criteria for when symmetry-related models are to be re-
garded as physically equivalent—and so need not always actually interpret such models as
being physically equivalent. For example, even for the interpretationalist it is plausible that
not all symmetry-related models should be interpreted as corresponding to the same possible
world, for consider e.g. the case of Galileo’s ship, in which only a subsystem in a model of
Newtonian mechanics is boosted—in this case, we have two symmetry-related models, which
nevertheless clearly do not correspond to the same possible world.16 Inserting this ‘typically’
clause does not obscure the interpretational view, however—for the salient point is the fol-
lowing: on the interpretational approach, the decision to interpret symmetry-related models as
being physically equivalent need not wait upon an explication of their shared ontology.17
Clearly, if the above ‘interpretational’ claim, and its ‘motivational’ alternative, are to have
substance, an appropriate definition of a symmetry transformation must be provided. Suppose
first that one defines such a transformation to be one upon the Oi in the KPMs of any given
theory T , such that DPMs of T are always taken to DPMs. Such a definition clearly will not
do, for, as Belot points out, it is much too broad: [6, p. 6]
to simply assert that the two models under consideration be interpreted as corresponding to some arbitrary
possible world).
15Here, we say potentially, for there does not necessarily exist any pressure to construct such a K˜. To illustrate,
consider the case of models related by a hole diffeomorphism in GR: even one who interprets such models as
corresponding to the same possible world is not obliged to construct such a reduced theory. Cf. §3.2.6 below.
16For a discussion of such issues, see [59, §2]; in this paper (modulo some brief considerations in §5.3), we
set these complications aside by considering only symmetry transformations which act ‘globally’ upon the Oi of
KPMs of T , rather than upon proper subsystems in those models.
17Our thanks to Neil Dewar and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion on this point.
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Ordinarily, symmetries of theories are hard to come by. But some remarkable
theories have atypically large symmetry groups. The definition above effaces this
sort of distinction between theories. For if we allow arbitrary permutations of the
solutions of a theory to count as symmetries, then the size of a theory’s group of
symmetries depends only on the size of its space of solutions.
Given this, a more nuanced definition of a symmetry transformation is required; following
e.g. [11,13,33], in this paper we take this to be one of empirical equivalence. Accordingly, we
define a symmetry transformation as follows: a symmetry of a theory T is any automorphism
of the space of DPMs of T , such that models related by that transformation are empirically
equivalent.18 By ‘empirical equivalence’, we in turn mean that all the structures in the models
under consideration corresponding to ‘physically observable data’ are identical between those
models—that is, that the ‘empirical substructures’ of these models in the sense of van Fraassen
[71, p. 64] coincide.19
It is important to be clear that we are not endorsing the above epistemic definition of a
symmetry transformation (or the parallel epistemic definition of a duality presented in §4.1).
Rather, we are merely taking it as given in this paper that symmetry-related models are empiri-
cally equivalent, while bracketing questions such as (i) whether that criterion should constitute
part of the ‘correct’ definition of a symmetry transformation; and (ii) whether it is universally
true that symmetry transformations relate (all and) only empirically equivalent models. It is,
however, worth noting that for models to even potentially be physically equivalent, they must
at the very least be empirically equivalent. Thus, even if one rejects the above definition of
‘symmetry’, one should recognise that the ‘symmetries’ relevant to our discussion here will
satisfy the condition of being empirically equivalent. For a further critical discussion of these
and related issues, see [46].
On the first definition of a symmetry transformation above—viz., that considered and dis-
missed by Belot—not only would it be incorrect to interpret ab initio all symmetry-related
models as being physically equivalent (for then all models of the theory in question would
18This definition of a symmetry transformation has the merit of being broadly analogous with our construal of
dualities, presented in §4.1.
19Each of [11, 13, 33] offer more nuanced ways of cashing out the ‘empirical equivalence’ criterion in the
above definition of a symmetry transformation—for example, Dasgupta appeals both to a notion of ‘how things
look’ [13, §6.3], and to Quinean ‘observation sentences’ [13, §6.3] (for details of such observation sentences,
see [56, 57]).
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be afforded the same interpretation), but, moreover, one would clearly not even be motivated
to find an interpretation according to which such models are physically equivalent. Thus, the
motivational approach is incompatible with such a definition of a symmetry transformation.
Prima facie, neither of these points holds for our revised definition of a symmetry transfor-
mation, featuring the additional criterion of empirical equivalence. The reason for this is
that such a definition is more restrictive—so it might be the case that one can argue that all
symmetry-related models may be regarded ab initio as being physically equivalent, in line
with the interpretational approach; moreover, one is apparently motivated to find a coherent
interpretation according to which such models are physically equivalent, essentially on the
grounds of Occam’s razor: since any structure leading to such models being interpreted as
physically distinct would not be part of the empirical substructures of those models (which are
identical), that structure is variant yet undetectable—so we have good prima facie grounds for
seeking to excise it.
3.2 Newtonian Gravitation Theory
In order to clarify and develop further the distinction between the interpretational and motiva-
tional approaches to symmetries, we consider in this section the case of Newtonian gravitation
theory (NGT).20 In §§3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we introduce (respectively) the KPMs, fundamen-
tal interpretational postulates, and DPMs of NGT. In §3.2.4, we introduce three important
classes of symmetries of NGT, before in §§3.2.5 and 3.2.6 discussing the interpretational and
motivational approaches in the context of these classes of symmetries.
Those readers uninterested in the technical details of NGT are advised to skip straight to
§3.2.4. In our view, it is necessary to spell out the technical details of this theory, because
we seek to provide a fully worked out example of what it means to fully explicate symmetry-
related models’ underlying ontology. More specifically, we feel the best way of conveying
what a ‘full explication’ (or ‘transparent understanding’) of the reality underlying symmetry-
related models amounts to is by analogy. Hence, we feel, the relevant technical details of this
example should be spelled out in full, even though the basic ideas can plausibly be understood
without them.
20For rigorous presentations of this theory, see e.g. [25, 28, 36, 55].
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3.2.1 Kinematically Possible Models
In its field-theoretic formulation, KPMs of NGT (set in Newtonian spacetime—see [25, pp. 33ff.],
and discussion below) are picked out by tuples 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa, ϕ, ρ〉, where M is a four-
dimensional differentiable manifold; tab is a temporal ‘metric’ field onM of signature (1, 0, 0, 0);
hab is a spatial ‘metric’ field on M of signature (0, 1, 1, 1);21 ∇a is a derivative operator on M ;
σa is a vector field; and ϕ and ρ are scalar fields that represent the gravitational potential field
and matter density, respectively. At the level of KPMs, the following four conditions hold:
habtab = 0, (3.1)
∇atbc = 0, (3.2)
∇ahbc = 0, (3.3)
tabσ
b 6= 0. (3.4)
We refer to (3.1) as an ‘orthogonality’ condition, and (3.2) and (3.3) as ‘compatibility’ condi-
tions. (3.4) ensures that σa has a component in the temporal direction,22 and so that the images
of its integral curves may be used to represent the persisting points of absolute space.
3.2.2 Interpretative Principles
Following Malament [36, p. 252], we now introduce the following interpretive principles in
NGT. Let I be an open interval in R. Then, for all smooth curves γ : I →M :
• γ is timelike23 if its image γ [I] could be the worldline of a point particle.
21Strictly, neither tab nor hab is a metric field—see e.g. [36, p. 250]. Insofar as they are not metric fields, tab
and hab are still tensor fields of rank (0, 2) and (2, 0), respectively.
22I.e. is timelike, in the sense of footnote 23.
23Given any vector θa at a point p ∈ M , we can take its ‘temporal length’ to be (tabθaθb)1/2. We further
classify θa as either ‘timelike’ or ‘spacelike’, depending on whether its temporal length is positive or zero,
respectively. We understand a smooth curve to be ‘timelike’ (respectively ‘spacelike’) if its tangent vectors are
of this character at every point along the curve. Note that (3.4) ensures that σa is a timelike vector field.
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• γ can be reparameterised so as to be a timelike geodesic (with respect to ∇a) iff γ [I]
could be the worldline of a free point particle.
• Clocks record the tab-length of their worldlines.
If a particle has the image of a timelike curve as its worldline, then we call the tangent field
ξa of that curve the ‘four-velocity’ field of the particle, and call ξb∇bξa its ‘four-acceleration’
field (note that strictly this is a spacelike quantity, representing the instantaneous rate of change
of the three-velocity of the body in question, as determined by an inertial observer). If the
particle has a mass m, then its four-acceleration field satisfies
F a = mξb∇bξa, (3.5)
where F a is a spacelike vector field (on the image of its worldline) that represents the net force
acting on the particle. This is the generalised form of Newton’s second law for NGT.
3.2.3 Dynamically Possible Models
With these principles in mind, we are now in a position to make explicit the DPMs of NGT.24
In NGT, one first imposes flatness of∇a via the field equation
Rabcd = 0. (3.6)
A second field equation of NG is Poisson’s equation,
hab∇a∇bϕ = 4piρ. (3.7)
24One may question whether these laws faithfully represent Newton’s thinking on these matters, since they
make no reference to the persisting point of absolute space, as picked out by σa. For an arguably less anachronis-
tic presentation of the laws of NGT set in Newtonian spacetime, see [55, §4.4]. The presentation of the dynamical
laws of this subsection will suffice for the purposes of this paper.
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Finally, the gravitational force on a point particle of massm is given by−mhab∇bϕ. It follows
from (3.5) that if the particle is subject to no forces except gravity, and if it has four-velocity
ξa, then it satisfies
−∇aϕ = ξb∇bξa. (3.8)
3.2.4 Symmetries of Newtonian Gravitation Theory
The above presentation of NGT in hand, consider now the symmetries of this theory. The sym-
metry group of NGT includes three kinds of transformations that are worth singling out: (A)
the ‘static shift’, which involves a time-independent translation of the total matter content of
the original solution; (B) the ‘kinematic shift’, which involves a time-independent velocity
‘boost’ of the total matter content of the original solution; and (C) the ‘dynamic shift’, which
involves a time-dependent translational acceleration of the total matter content of the original
solution, plus an appropriate transformation of the gravitational potential field.25
It is possible—and useful—to characterise all of these symmetries model-theoretically.
Taking our original model to be M = 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa, ϕ, ρ〉, a static-shifted model can
be written Mstat = 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa, d∗ϕ, d∗ρ〉, where d is the appropriate diffeomor-
phism corresponding to a spatial translation. Straightforwardly—or ‘literally’—understood,
the world represented byMstat differs from that represented byM with regard to which par-
ticular points of space are underlying various parts of the matter fields. For instance, if M
represents the centre of mass of the universe26 as being located here, thenMstat will represent
the centre of mass of the universe as being located e.g. 3m to the left of here.
Consider now the kinematic shift. The generic model yielded by applying the kinematic
shift toM can be writtenMkin = 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa, d∗ϕ, d∗ρ〉, where d is now the appro-
priate diffeomorphism corresponding to a velocity boost. Straightforwardly understood, the
25The terms ‘static shift’ and ‘kinematic shift’ are relatively standard in the literature, and are originally due
to Maudlin [42, §3]. The term ‘dynamic shift’ is slightly less standard, and is due to Huggett [31, §8.3].
26One worry regarding speaking of the ‘centre of mass of the universe’ is the following: this notion may
only be well-defined under a certain restricted set of circumstances (for example, when the mass density ρ is
asymptotically zero at infinity). Given this, it may be preferable to resort to the following fix: use instead the
centre of mass of some arbitrary body of matter. Our thanks to Neil Dewar for raising this point.
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world represented byMkin differs from that represented byM with regard to the absolute ve-
locity of the material universe. For instance, ifM represents the centre of mass of the universe
as being absolutely at rest, thenMkin will represent it as moving e.g. 3ms−1 due North.
Finally, the generic model yielded by applying the dynamic shift to M can be written
Mdyn = 〈M, tab, hab,∇a, σa, d∗ϕ′, d∗ρ〉, where d is a diffeomorphism corresponding to an ele-
ment of the so-called ‘Maxwell group’ of transformations, and where the gravitational poten-
tial field is transformed by an appropriate ‘internal’ transformation.27 Thus, straightforwardly
understood, the world represented byMdyn differs from that represented byM with regard
to what the absolute translational acceleration of the material universe is alleged to be. For
instance, if M represents the material universe as being absolutely non-accelerating, then
Mdyn will represent its centre of mass as accelerating in a straight line under a gravitational
force-field, at e.g. 3ms−2 due North.
In sum: the symmetries of NGT include transformations that map DPMs to other DPMs
that prima facie represent physically distinct worlds. Nevertheless, no observer ‘embedded’ in
any of these worlds can determine which world is hers: the worlds represented by these mod-
els are ‘empirically indistinguishable’—so these symmetry-related models are indeed ‘empir-
ically equivalent’, in line with the definition of a symmetry transformation presented in §3.1.
This is because all relative distances and velocities between material systems are preserved
among the worlds in question, and all an observer has empirical access to are (ratios of) such
distances and velocities.28 Thus, such an observer would not be able to determine whether she
is stationary, moving uniformly, or accelerating relative to the persisting points of absolute
space: all of these scenarios are underdetermined by the empirical phenomena.
3.2.5 Interpretation and Motivation in Newtonian Gravitation Theory
So much for the symmetries of NGT. How do the interpretational and motivational approaches
discussed in §3.1 play out in this theory? In the present context, the distinction can be stated
easily. Consider again the models M, Mstat, Mkin, and Mdyn. According to the former
27Following [25, §2.3], the Maxwell group of transformations is defined as ~x → ~x′ = R~x + ~a (t); t → t′ =
t+ d. The ‘internal’ transformation on ϕ is defined as ϕ→ ϕ′ = ϕ− ~x · ~¨a+ f (t). For further details, see [34].
28By ‘ratios of’ distances and velocities, we have in mind such notions relative to a pre-defined standard of
measurement—e.g. the Parisian ‘metre rod’.
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view, it is legitimate to take ab initio all of these models—which prima facie represent distinct
physical scenarios—to in fact represent the same state of affairs, i.e. the same possible world,
even absent a coherent picture of their common ontology.
The motivational view, on the other hand, denies that it is permissible to so regard symmetry-
related models as being physically equivalent. Rather, on this view, the symmetries of a theory
invariably at most motivate one to seek a clear understanding of the common ontology under-
pinning such models’ physical equivalence. That is, according to this view, models related by
a symmetry transformation cannot be regarded as physically equivalent simpliciter. Instead,
construing such models as physically equivalent is only justified once one has a clear under-
standing of the reality allegedly underlying them: a clear understanding that we are, according
to the motivational view, invariably motivated to seek by the symmetry in question. Thus,
on the motivational view, absent a clear understanding of how it could be that M, Mstat,
Mkin, andMdyn are to be regarded as physically equivalent (in terms of a clear explication
of their common ontology), we may not regard them as so being physically equivalent, i.e. as
corresponding to the same possible world.
3.2.6 Mathematical Reformulation
Importantly, the motivational approach is not committed to the view that whenever one is
presented with a theory T with a symmetry between mathematically distinct models, one is
motivated to mathematically reformulate T so as to remove any such (alleged) representational
redundancy (such that models of the reformulated theory are constructed by quotienting the
space of models of the original theory by the action of the symmetry in question).29 Rather—
and this will become important in our discussion of dualities in §5—we claim that such a
mathematical reformulation is motivated only when the models in question are not isomorphic,
i.e. when (straightforwardly understood) they differ more than merely with regard to which
objects play which qualitative roles.30,31 As we will now discuss, this means that, according to
29One may here understand ‘mathematical reformulation’ to mean: an alteration of the space of models of the
theory (whether KPMs or DPMs). This will become clear through the examples presented in this subsection.
30Here, ‘object’ refers to any substructure of the model in question—rather than (necessarily) to the geometric
objects Oi introduced in the KPMs of a generic theory T in §2.
31Note that isomorphism of two spaces of models (e.g. D˜1 and D˜2, associated respectively to two theories T1
and T2)—as introduced in §1, and discussed further in §4.1 below—should not be confused with isomorphism of
a given pair of models themselves. It is the latter that is under consideration here.
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the motivational view, in the case of NGT only the kinematic and dynamic shifts motivate us
to mathematically reformulate the theory so as to remove any representational redundancy.
The static shift in NGT is crucially distinct from the kinematic and dynamic shift—for
the reason that the models in question in this case are isomorphic. And indeed, there ex-
ists a straightforward means of understanding such isomorphic models’ physical equivalence,
which necessitates no mathematical reformulation of the theory. This view goes by a variety
of names in the literature: in spacetime contexts, it is most commonly referred to as ‘sophisti-
cated substantivalism’.32 The sophisticated substantivalist denies that spacetime points possess
primitive transworld identities; instead, they are ‘contextually individuated’ [35, §5]: they are
not to be construed as being anything less, or more, than ‘nodes’ in the relational, geometri-
cal structures in which they are embedded. This view is still a version of substantivalism, in
the sense that it is committed to points of space being fundamental, basic elements of reality.
Crucially, however, this view denies that there are any primitive, singular (haecceitistic) facts
about spacetime points (e.g. this particular point of space is materially occupied) which would
even allow for a physical distinction between statically shifted scenarios to be drawn.
Analogous considerations apply in the context of more modern physical theories; the dif-
feomorphism invariance of GR provides a case in point. Just as for the static shift in NGT,
the existence of this symmetry is alleged to commit the substantivalist to a plurality of physi-
cally distinct, but nevertheless empirically indistinguishable, possibilities. Once again, we can
phrase this in model-theoretic terms: taking a generic DPM of GR,M = 〈M, gab,Φ〉, we can
apply an arbitrary diffeomorphism d to yield a new DPM,M′ = 〈M,d∗gab, d∗Φ〉. A popular
allegation—the canonical version of which can be found in [26, §4]—is that the spacetime
substantivalist is committed to regarding the two worlds represented by these models as dif-
fering with regard to which particular points of the spacetime manifold are underlying various
parts of the metric and matter fields.33
We hope it is clear that, if adopting sophisticated substantivalism constitutes a legitimate
response to the alleged problem of NGT’s static shift symmetry, it should count as an equally
32See, e.g., [53, p. 575]. Other names for this view include ‘moderate structural realism’ about spacetime [27,
pp. 31-2] and ‘non-reductive relationalism’ [64, §5].
33Here we ignore the related (but distinct) ‘indeterminism’ objection to substantivalism in the context of GR
raised at [26, §5]. The reasons for this are twofold. First, this objection is not directly related to the static shift
argument in NGT. Second, sophisticated substantivalism also seems sufficient as a response (for more on this
latter point, see [51, §4.1.4]).
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legitimate response to the alleged problem of GR’s diffeomorphism symmetry. That is, adopt-
ing sophisticated substantivalism should be sufficient for one to be able to understand, in a
perfectly transparent way, how it is that diffeormorphism-related models in GR are to be re-
garded as physically equivalent, without any mathematical reformulation of the theory being
necessitated—just as in the case of the shift symmetry of NGT.34
Now return to the case of non-isomorphic symmetry-related models in NGT, namelyM,
Mkin, andMdyn. ‘Literally understood’, such models do not represent possible worlds which
differ merely haecceitistically. Hence, adopting sophisticated substantivalism is by itself in-
sufficient to be able to understand how such models are to be regarded as physically equiva-
lent.35 Thus, (we claim) we are motivated to mathematically reformulate the theory so as to
obtain a coherent understanding of the common ontology underpinning such models’ physical
equivalence.36
Such a mathematical reformulation of the theory is indeed possible. In fact, for the kine-
matic shift, it is trivial: one simply excises σa from KPMs of the theory—so that the question
of two otherwise-identical models differing only in the absolute velocity of the centre of mass
of the matter content they represent does not arise. In other words, one moves from Newtonian
spacetime—where the persistence of points of space through time is assured (since, recall, the
histories of these points are associated with the integral curves of the σa field), and where the
associated notion of absolute velocity is physically meaningful—to Galilean spacetime, where
the persistence of points of space through time and the associated notion of absolute velocity
no longer make physical sense, but where the difference between straight (inertial) and curved
(accelerating) trajectories through spacetime remains physically meaningful.37
In the case of the dynamic shift, reformulation is also possible—though somewhat less
34Cf. footnote 15. Of course, sophisticated substantivalism constitutes just one of many positions available in
the vicinity of discussions of the hole argument. For a recent review of the literature, see [54, §7].
35For the parallel point in the case of dualities, see [59, §5.3]. Cf. §5.1.
36Note that, since the mathematically reformulated theory will have a different space of models to the original
theory (cf. footnote 29), it may best be regarded as a new theory, distinct from the original (on the setup of §2).
37For further discussion, see e.g. [25, §2.4] and [43, pp. 54-66]. Although such a reformulation of NGT may
appear trivial from a modern four-dimensional, differentio-geometric perspective, it certainly would not have
appeared so to Newton or his contemporaries. This appearance of triviality is arguably reinforced by the fact
that, in setting up NGT, we have (following the canonical literature on this subject, in particular [28, pp. 71-
94]) formulated the laws directly in terms of ∇a, rather than σa. For more on this point, see [55, p. 134]; for
a discussion of NGT which puts particular emphasis on the non-triviality of the move to Galilean spacetime,
see [43, pp. 54-66].
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straightforward. (Those readers uninterested in the technical details here are advised to skip
both this and the following paragraph.) Here—having already eliminated σa from the models
of the theory—one replaces the flat derivative operator ∇a of NGT with a (partly) dynamical
derivative operator ∇ˆa,38,39 for which the DPMs then require that the associated curvature
tensor Rˆabcd satisfies
Rˆbc = 4piρtbtc, (3.9)
Rˆa cb d = Rˆ
c a
d b, (3.10)
Rˆabcd = 0, (3.11)
and one also eliminates the gravitational potential ϕ from KPMs of the theory—so that they
are quintuples 〈M, tab, hab, ∇ˆa, ρ〉. (3.9) is the geometrised version of Poission’s equation
(3.7); (3.10) holds in a classical spacetime iff this admits, at least locally, a smooth, unit
timelike field ξa that is geodesic (ξb∇bξa = 0) and twist-free (∇[aξb] = 0) [36, p. 281]; (3.11)
holds throughout M iff parallel transport of spacelike vectors in M is, at least locally, path-
independent [36, p. 279]. The resulting theory is known as ‘Newton-Cartan theory’ (NCT).
It can be shown—via Trautman’s geometrisation and recovery theorems40—that the class
of models of NGT which differ by a dynamic shift all map (up to isomorphism) to the same
model of NCT. Moreover, for all timelike curves of M with four-velocity field ξa, particles
subject to a gravitational force in NGT (so that ξb∇bξa = −∇aϕ) move along geodesics in
NCT (so that ξb∇ˆbξa = 0). In other words, in NCT gravity is no longer a force, as in NGT.
For our purposes, the crucial point to note is the following: by reformulating NGT a` la
NCT as per the above, one constructs a mathematical reformulation of the theory which elimi-
nates the gauge redundancy (in the sense of §2) manifest in the possibility of a dynamic shift in
38∇ˆa is related to∇a by ∇ˆa = (∇a, Cabc ), with Cabc = −tbtc∇aϕ; bracket notation for derivative operators
means that ∇ˆa, ∇a, and Cabc are related by (∇′c −∇c)αa1...arb1...bs = αa1...ardb2...bsCdcb1 + . . . + αa1...arb1...bs−1dCdcbs −
αda2...arb1...bs C
a1
cd − . . . − αa1...ar−1db1...bs Carcd ; and ta is a covector field which may (locally) be defined from tab via
tab = tatb in a ‘temporally orientable’ spacetime—for details, see [36, pp. 250-251].
39We say ‘partly’ rather than ‘fully’ dynamical in light of the compatibility conditions (3.2) and (3.3), which
hold also for ∇ˆa.
40For original sources, see [70]; for contemporary discussion and proofs, see [36, pp. 267ff.].
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NGT.41 Note also the important point that moving to NCT is not by itself sufficient to be able
to understand as physically equivalent all symmetry-related models of Newtonian theory set
in flat spacetime. This is because—as mentioned in the previous paragraph—such symmetry-
related models will typically correspond to a single model of NCT only up to isomorphism.
Thus, in order to have a fully transparent understanding of how it is that symmetry-related
models of Newtonian theory set in flat spacetime can correspond to a single model of NCT, a
sophisticated substantivalist conception of spacetime ontology is also required.42
To summarise: According to the interpretational approach, it is typically legitimate ab ini-
tio to regard symmetry-related models as being physically equivalent, even absent a coherent
explication of their common ontology. According to the motivational approach, by contrast, it
is not legitimate ab initio to regard symmetry-related models as being physically equivalent.
Rather, symmetries invariably at most motivate one to seek a coherent explication of the com-
mon ontology underpinning such models’ physical equivalence. When the symmetry-related
models in question are not isomorphic, one is motivated to mathematically reformulate the
theory. On the other hand, when they are isomorphic, one is not motivated to mathematically
reformulate the theory: adopting ‘moderate structuralism’—which, in the spacetime context,
we take to be equivalent to sophisticated substantivalism43—is invariably sufficient.
3.3 Motivating Motivation
Up to this point, we have remained officially neutral between the interpretational and moti-
vational approaches to symmetry transformations. Here, however, developing upon [45, §4],
we wish to argue explicitly for the latter. One argument in favour of this position is the fol-
lowing: even if the central claim of the interpretational approach—that one may legitimately
41For further details, see [34]. Note also that Saunders [65] has argued on the basis of similar considerations
that the appropriate spacetime setting for Newtonian theory is in fact ‘Newton-Huygens spacetime’, a close
relative of what Earman [25, §2.3] has dubbed ‘Maxwellian spacetime’. For illuminating discussion of Saunders’
paper, see [22, 69, 75, 77].
42A similar moral applies in the case of moving to Galilean spacetime as a response to NGT’s boost invariance.
Many thanks to David Wallace for pushing us on this point.
43We draw the term ‘moderate structuralism’ from [27]; compare also the ‘modest structuralism’ of [52,
p. 102]. According to this view, objects (e.g. points of spacetime) are construed as being nothing more (or less)
than ‘nodes’ in the relational structures in which they are embedded; and the possibility of purely haecceitistic
distinctions between worlds is denied. Construed in this way, moderate structuralism encompasses sophisticated
substantivalism—but is a stronger thesis due to the latter clause.
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regard certain symmetry-related models of a theory as being physically equivalent even in the
absence of a coherent picture of their common ontology—is true, on this approach, the reality
in terms of which this physical equivalence is to be understood will, absent further details,
remain opaque. That is, without further work, the advocate of the interpretational approach
offers no explanation as to how such physical equivalence is to be construed, or how it could
even be said to arise. To the extent that the interpretational view is not supposed to reduce
to an uninteresting form of instrumentalism, it is unclear what realistic picture of the world
is being propounded by the defender of this position; it is opaque what, according to her, the
world really is like.
Here, one must separate two closely-related points. First, the advocate of the interpreta-
tional approach may be regarded as shirking her responsibility to provide a coherent expli-
cation of the common ontology associated with symmetry-related models; this, however, is
where much of the most interesting work in the foundations of physics is done.44 Second,
the advocate of the interpretational approach makes at the outset an assumption that certain
symmetry-related models admit of a coherent interpretation which makes manifest their phys-
ical equivalence.45 In our view, it is more cautious to avoid such an assumption: to only regard
symmetry-related models as being physically equivalent once an explication of their common
ontology can be provided; to consider us always motivated to attempt to construct such an
explication; and thereby to favour the motivational over the interpretational approach.
Having said this, it is worth distinguishing two sub-views within the motivational ap-
proach. According to the former, more confident view, symmetry-related models may only
be regarded as being physically equivalent once an interpretation affording a coherent expli-
cation of their common ontology is provided, but such an interpretation is always guaranteed
to exist. By contrast, according to the latter, more cautious view, symmetry-related models
may only be regarded as being physically equivalent once a coherent explication of their com-
mon ontology is provided, and there is no guarantee that such an interpretation exists. It
should be clear from the foregoing that we favour the latter, more cautious strand of motiva-
44For example, the staunchest advocate of the interpretational approach would likely not be motivated to
consider whether NGT can be reformulated in terms of Galilean spacetime, or NCT: the bare assertion that
models of NGT related by kinematic or dynamic shifts are physically equivalent effectively eliminates motivation
for the advocate of the interpretational approach to pursue this research programme.
45Cf. footnote 14. Here, the advocate of the interpretational approach may be guided by overarching, a priori
principles, connecting certain features of the symmetry-related models under consideration with their physical
equivalence. However, unless a necessary connection between such features and the physical equivalence of the
models can be forged, the point in the body of this paragraph stands.
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tionalism.46 Articulating these two distinct versions of the motivational approach will prove
illuminating, when it comes to constructing a taxonomy of the views of philosophical authors
in the parallel case of dualities—cf. in particular §5.3.
4 Equivalence and Duality
In the previous section, we distinguished the interpretational and motivational approaches to
symmetry transformations, and defended the latter, expanding upon [45, §4]. In this section,
we introduce the notions of ‘theoretical equivalence’ and ‘underdetermination’, both of which
will prove important in our defence of the motivational approach to dualities in §5.
4.1 Theoretical Equivalence and Duality
We now introduce a notion of ‘theoretical equivalence’. Given two theories T1 and T2, with
respective spaces of DPMsD1 ⊂ K1 andD2 ⊂ K2, we say (broadly following [76,78,79]) that
these are ‘theoretically equivalent’ iff (i) there exists an isomorphism between D˜1 of T1 and D˜2
of T2;47 and (ii) the empirical predictions corresponding to each M˜1 ∈ D˜1 are identical to the
empirical predictions corresponding to the associated M˜2 ∈ D˜2.48 If (i) holds of two theories
but not (ii), then we say that they are (merely) ‘formally equivalent’; if (ii) holds of two
theories but not (i), then we say that they are (merely) ‘empirically equivalent’.49 Two theories
are theoretically equivalent iff they are formally equivalent and empirically equivalent.
Turn now to the notion of duality: a pervasive phenomenon in string theory.50 The four
46We owe the nomenclature of ‘confident’ versus ‘cautious’ versions of the motivational approach to Jeremy
Butterfield.
47Recall from §2 that, for a given theory T , D˜ denotes the gauge-reduced space of DPMs of T . Note also that
one may introduce a graded notion of theoretical equivalence, by imposing restrictions on the structure of the
models preserved by this isomorphism. Though important to note, this latter point will be set aside in this paper.
48Each M˜1 ∈ D˜1 and M˜2 ∈ D˜2 which correspond to the same empirical predictions in this way may be
said to be ‘empirically equivalent’—cf. §3.1. Note that two models may be empirically equivalent without the
theories to which they belong being empirically equivalent, in the sense given below.
49The map between M˜1 ∈ D˜1 and M˜2 ∈ D˜2 may not be one-one in the absence of formal equivalence.
50For philosophically-oriented introductions to dualities—including all the theories and their respective dual-
ities mentioned in this paragraph—see e.g. [50, 60]. For more recent and nuanced philosophical approaches to
dualities, see [9, 15, 17].
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best-known examples of dualities arising in string theory are ‘T-duality’, ‘mirror symmetry’,
‘S-duality’, and the ‘AdS/CFT correspondence’. In the case of T-duality, type IIA superstring
theory on a product manifold M × S1 with radius of the periodic dimension R is found to be
theoretically equivalent to type IIB superstring theory on the product M × S1 with radius of
the periodic dimension proportional to 1/R [4, ch. 6]. Mirror symmetry is a generalisation
of T-duality to the case of topologically inequivalent manifolds.51 S-duality relates models of
one superstring theory with string coupling constant gs to models of another superstring theory
with string coupling constant 1/gs; it is thus a so-called ‘strong/weak’ duality. For example,
strongly/weakly coupled type I superstring theory is theoretically equivalent under S-duality
to weakly/strongly coupled SO (32) heterotic string theory [4, §8.2]. Finally, in the AdS/CFT
correspondence (originally introduced in [37]), a string theory in so-called ‘AdS spacetime’
is theoretically equivalent to a conformal field theory (CFT) in a lower number of spacetime
dimensions [4, ch. 12].
In addition to being theoretically equivalent (indeed, we take theoretical equivalence as the
definition of a duality in the ensuing), should duality-related models also be understood as be-
ing physically equivalent—i.e., as representing the same possible world? Before we attempt to
answer this question, two related points are worth stating. First, dualities are (more) analogous
to the kinematic and dynamic shifts than to the static shifts of §3.2.4—for the reason that dual
models are generically not isomorphic: straightforwardly understood, they represent worlds
which differ more than purely with regard to which particular objects are playing which quali-
tative roles (see e.g. [59, p. 224]). Hence—as we will elaborate—dualities in general motivate
mathematical reformulation; adopting moderate structuralism is by itself insufficient to un-
derstand satisfactorily the (alleged) physical equivalence of duality-related models. Second,
the apparent physical difference between duality-related models can be much more striking
than in the case of e.g. models of NGT related by kinematic and dynamic shifts: naı¨vely un-
derstood, the possible worlds they represent are very different. For instance, models related
by an AdS/CFT-type duality differ in the number of dimensions they (appear to) attribute to
spacetime; models related by mirror symmetry differ in the topology they (appear to) attribute
to spacetime.
51For a philosophical introduction to mirror symmetry, see [62].
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4.2 Underdetermination
The distinction between formal and empirical equivalence is of value when discussing whether
a pair of theories exhibits ‘strong underdetermination of theory by evidence’. We say that
two theories T1 and T2 present such a case when they are empirically equivalent, yet there
exists at least one pair of empirically equivalent models M˜1 ∈ D˜1 and M˜2 ∈ D˜2 which are
nevertheless interpreted as corresponding to distinct possible worlds, respectively W1 and W2.
To have a case of strong underdetermination, the two theories must be empirically equiva-
lent; however, one may ask whether formal equivalence is also relevant. Distinguish:
(A) T1 and T2 being empirically equivalent and formally equivalent.
(B) T1 and T2 being empirically equivalent but not formally equivalent.
Any argument to the effect that instances of (A) cannot lead to strong underdetermination52
is (roughly) in line with the Quinean position according to which theories related by recon-
strual of predicates (the analogue of formal equivalence) are understood not to lead to such
underdetermination [57].53,54 However, consider again models related by e.g. the AdS/CFT
correspondence, or mirror symmetry. In spite of an instantiation of formal equivalence, such
models of these theories at least appear to be ontologically distinct, and thus to correspond
to distinct possible worlds.55 Now, when it comes to deciding whether (A) can indeed lead to
strong underdetermination, one can be aided by one’s prior commitments in the philosophy of
science: even if one is a realist, it may be that by e.g. giving some structuralist account, one
can make plausible that models of such theories correspond to the same world (in this regard
52I.e. to the effect that each M˜1 ∈ D˜1 and its associated M˜2 ∈ D˜2 must correspond to the same world.
53For a critical discussion of the Quinean approach to theoretical equivalence, see [1]. With the conclusion of
that paper—“If one takes Quine equivalence as the standard for theoretical equivalence, one underestimates the
threat of underdetermination” [1, p. 483]—we are in agreement. Cf. also [2].
54To allay any possible misunderstanding: Quine’s view on this matter is not that theories with isomorphic
spaces of solutions are always theoretically, or even empirically, equivalent. Rather, Quine holds a strictly
stronger view on what it is for two theories to be theoretically equivalent: if theories are related by a suitable
reconstrual of predicates, then such theories are theoretically equivalent. This, plausibly, entails that their re-
spective spaces of solutions are isomorphic. But, for Quine, the fact that theories have isomorphic spaces of
solutions does not by itself entail that they are theoretically or even empirically equivalent.
55The concern, therefore, is over the adequacy of formal equivalence—which is, indeed, a formal notion—to
capture an informal or semantic notion: that of two models representing the same possible world. Our thanks to
Jeremy Butterfield for suggesting that we put the matter in this way.
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in the context of dualities, see [39]).56,57 Nonetheless, examples such as this demonstrate that
instances of (A) might, prima facie, give rise to strong underdetermination (cf. [39, p. 474])—
pace Quine, who argued in [57] that only instances of (B) could constitute genuine cases
of strong underdetermination.58 The relevance of this for our views on the interpretation of
dualities will become apparent in §5.
5 Duality as Motivation
5.1 Interpretation and Motivation, Reprise
Above, we saw the prima facie plausibility of interpreting duality-related models as represent-
ing distinct possible worlds. This, however, runs against a common view, that duality-related
models may typically be taken ab initio to represent the same possible world. For example,
Rickles writes:59
[D]ual theories are simply examples of theoretically equivalent descriptions of
the same underlying physical content: I distinguish them from cases of genuine
underdetermination on the grounds that there is no real incompatibility involved
between the descriptions. The incompatibility is at the level of purely unphysical
structure. I argue that dual pairs are in fact very strongly analogous to gauge-
related solutions ... I conjecture that dualities always point to a more fundamental
56This said, Rickles has recently suggested that cases such as the AdS/CFT correspondence may give rise to
structural underdetermination [60, 61, 63]. (We concur with this view; cf. footnote 57 below.) Note that if this is
so, then even the structuralist may not be able to argue that such pairs of formally equivalent models correspond
to the same possible world.
57In our view, adopting structural realism as a means of identifying symmetry-related models succeeds only if
the models in question are ‘naı¨vely’ understood as representing at most haecceitistically distinct possible worlds.
In that case, it is clear how adopting structural realism allows us to identify such (putatively) distinct physically
possibilities as (actually) not distinct after all. However, if the models in question are ‘naı¨vely’ understood as
representing more than haecceitistically distinct possible worlds, then adopting structural realism (by itself) is
insufficient to provide grounds for understanding the models in question as corresponding to the same possible
world.
58If this is correct, then we concur with De Haro et al. that “we will need to allow that formal isomorphisms
do not in general imply sameness of content” [19, §3.1]. Cf. footnote 55.
59For further clear expression of this position, see e.g. [40, 41].
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(intrinsic) description, namely that in which the representational redundancy is
eliminated. [63, p. 62]
This position bears striking similarity to the interpretational approach to symmetries.60
Indeed, by analogy, we may define at this juncture an interpretational approach to dualities.
According to this, when presented with a pair of duality-related theories, we are (a) typi-
cally warranted in first interpreting duality-related models as representing the same possible
world—even absent a coherent explication of their common ontology;61 then may (but are
not required to) go on to (b) identify those pairs of dual models, thereby constructing the
space of KPMs K¯ of a new theory T¯ , which represents the ‘common core’ (in the language
of [15, §2.2]) of the duality-related theories; and (c) having constructed such a K¯, seek to
provide a coherent picture of the ontology of the models M¯ ∈ K¯.
In contrast with this interpretational approach to dualities, one may also define a motiva-
tional approach to dualities. According to this view, the existence of a duality between two
theories first (a) motivates us to provide a coherent picture of the common ontology of the
pairs of models of these two theories related by the duality; but only once such a characteri-
sation is constructed should we (b) interpret those models as representing the same possible
world; and (potentially) (c) identity those models to construct a space of KPMs K¯ of some
new theory T¯ , which represents the ‘common core’ of the duality-related theories.
It is important to distinguish two sub-positions within the interpretational view. On the first
such view, the existence of a duality motivates us to seek a clear picture of the ontology alleged
to underlie the dual-related models.62 On the second view—by contrast—no such search for a
coherent understanding of the common ontology of the dual models is required.63 Importantly,
however (and to reiterate), both of these sub-positions are consistent with the interpretational
view. By contrast, the advocate of the motivational approach to dualities maintains that it is
only legitimate to regard duality-related models as being physically equivalent if one possesses
a clear picture of the common ontology of the dual models.
60One might argue that the final sentence here is in line with the motivational approach. Even if this is true,
however, in our view it is not correct to read Rickles as endorsing the motivational approach, in light of the
preceding sentences in the quote—see below.
61Here, the same points from §3.1 regarding the ‘typicality’ clause arise again.
62This view appears more popular in the literature; cf. again e.g. [63, p. 62], and footnote 60.
63This can be considered the analogy of Dewar’s approach to symmetries in the case of dualities [20, p. 322].
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Following §3.3, one can also introduce two sub-positions within the motivational approach
to dualities—according to the former, more confident view, duality-related models should not
be regarded as being physically equivalent absent a coherent explication of their common on-
tology, but such an explication is always guaranteed to be found; according to the latter, more
cautious view, duality-related models should not be regarded as being physically equivalent
absent a coherent explication of their common ontology, and no such explication is guaran-
teed to be found. This distinction between sub-positions within the motivational approach will
prove to be illuminating in §5.3, when we consider the views of certain authors vis-a`-vis the
interpretation of duality-related models.
Regardless of where they may stand in the above debate, many authors—both physicists
and philosophers—maintain that string-theoretic dualities motivate us to seek a mathematical
reformulation of the dual string theories.64 Since duality-related models are generically non-
isomorphic, we concur with this verdict (cf. §4.1). Where the advocate of the motivational
approach disagrees with some of such authors, however, is on the question of whether, in the
absence of any mathematical reformulation of string theory, it is legitimate to regard duality-
related models as being physically equivalent: in her view, it is not. Moreover, it is precisely
on this issue that we disagree with the commonly-held interpretational view.65
Given the importance of this point for the purposes of this paper, it is worth repeating.
When presented with two symmetry- or duality-related models, the interpretationalist will
64Or quantum field theories, in the case of e.g. the AdS/CFT correspondence.
65Perhaps it is true that many recent philosophical authors’ views on dualities are more subtle than a straight-
forward endorsement of the interpretational approach, a` la Rickles [63, p. 62]. This notwithstanding, however,
a reader unfamiliar with the literature on dualities may obtain the impression that the interpretational approach
is widely embraced. Here is some prima facie evidence to support this claim: “[D]ual [theories] should be un-
derstood as giving physically equivalent descriptions” [32, pp. 87-88]; “In all dualities, it is the theories that
are equivalent. ... [C]ertain transformations ‘don’t matter’. The only difference between these [dual] transfor-
mations and standard gauge symmetries is that they seem to relate things that look like they really should mat-
ter!” [63, p. 64]; “[Our] conception of duality meshes with two dual theories being ‘gauge-related’, in the general
philosophical sense of being physically equivalent. For a string duality, such as T-duality and gauge/gravity du-
ality, this means taking such features as the radius of a compact dimension, and the dimensionality of spacetime,
to be ‘gauge”’ [19, p. 68]; “The stance adopted [in this paper] is ... to avoid a literal reading of the elemen-
tary/composite interchange and, on this basis, to avoid mixing the question of its meaning with the question of
physical fundamentality. The attitude is analogous to the one shared in this volume [a recent special issue of
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics devoted to dualities] about how to understand appar-
ently puzzling features such as the interchange of tiny and huge dimensions connected with T-duality in string
theory, or the duality of dimension under the AdS/CFT (gauge/gravity) correspondence. The underlying idea is
that, what the dual descriptions do not agree upon, should not be attributed a real physical significance. In fact,
this means nothing else than saying that the physics (including its ontology) remains the same under the duality.
What changes, is just the way of looking at it” [10, p. 101].
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typically say that it is legitimate to regard such models as physically equivalent. The motiva-
tionalist will deny this: for her, the mere fact that models are related by a symmetry or duality
transformation is not a sufficient reason to regard them as physically equivalent. This is what
crucially separates the interpretationalist and motivationalist positions.
The motivationalist will go on to say that, for any two symmetry- or duality-related models,
we are motivated to try to provide an explication of the common ontology that is alleged
to underlie them. The interpretationalist will not always agree. Some interpretationalists
(e.g. Rickles [63]) will claim that that we are so motivated. But not all will (e.g. Dewar
[20]). In other words, the interpretationalist and the motivationalist do not invariably agree
about motivation. Thus, merely claiming that dualities motivate us to formulate (e.g.) ‘M-
theory’66—which is conjectured to be the theory which would transparently explain dual string
theories’ physical equivalence—is not sufficient to make one a motivationalist.67
To close this subsection, it is worth reflecting further on the nature of the ontology ‘com-
mon’ to two dual models; two broad attitudes are possible here. First, given two theories un-
derstood to be dual, one may attempt to identify the ‘shared structure’ across duality-related
models;68 one may then use this as a guide to the interpretation of the dual theories. This
austere approach to the interpretation of dualities is advanced in e.g. [15, §2.2]. On the other
hand, one may be more ambitious. For example, one may construct a new theory, such that
dual models of the original theories each constitute (partial) descriptions of certain models of
the new theory. The approach of attempting to find an overarching ‘M-theory’, of which all
five superstring theories are ‘limits’ (in some appropriate sense—cf. §5.2), fits naturally into
this latter category. It is worth remarking, however, that as it stands the existence of such
a theory—as well as our ability to discover it—remains conjectural; for further discussion,
66See below for further discussion of this theory.
67An anonymous reviewer has questioned whether our nomenclature for these two positions is entirely apt.
This is for two main reasons: (i) It appears to obscure the fact that both the interpretational and motivational
approaches are, broadly speaking, possible ways of ‘interpreting’ theories; (ii) It might suggest that the inter-
pretationalist never agrees with the motivationalist on the issue of whether one is motivated to reformulate a
given theory in the presence of certain symmetries. With regard to (i): We agree that both approaches are, in
some sense, possible ways of ‘interpreting’ physical theories, although we disagree that our nomenclature truly
obscures this fact. (Our claim is simply that someone who endorses the interpretational approach to symmetries
is not ‘interpreting’ symmetries the right way; the right way to ‘interpret’ them is motivationally!) With regard
to (ii): As noted in the main text, although the interpretationalist might agree with the motivationalist on the
issue of motivation in certain cases, she need not always do so. Motivation is not an essential component of the
interpretationalist’s position, as it is for the motivationalist.
68That is, the formal structure preserved across duality-related models—cf. [15, 21]. This is the ‘common
core’ of the two dual models, in the sense given above.
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see [60, §5.2] and [59, §5]. For a recent, detailed clarification of the distinction between these
two approaches to explicating the ontology ‘common’ to duality-related models, see [16].
5.2 Motivating Dualities as Motivation
As with the debate between advocates of the interpretational and motivational approaches to
symmetries (cf. §3.3), we endorse the latter approach to dualities over the former. Our reasons
for doing so broadly mirror those given in §3.3. First, just as in the case of symmetry trans-
formations, the interpretationalist may be regarded as shirking her responsibility to provide a
coherent explication of the common ontology associated to duality-related models. Second,
the interpretationalist assumes at the outset that certain duality-related models admit of a co-
herent interpretation which makes manifest their physical equivalence. In our view, however,
it is more cautious to drop such an assumption: to only regard duality-related models as being
physically equivalent once an explication of their common ontology can be provided; to con-
sider us always motivated to attempt to construct such an explication; and thereby to favour
the motivational over the interpretational approach to dualities. (We return in a moment to the
distinction between two strands of motivationalism drawn in §§3.3 and 5.1.)
With the above in mind, recall now that some authors, such as Polchinski, define duality
such that “we have a single quantum system that has two classical limits” [50, p. 7]—from
which one concludes that “it is fruitless to argue whether [T ] or [T ′] provide [sic] the fun-
damental description of the world; rather, it is the full quantum theory” [50, p. 7].69 If one
approaches dualities in this manner, then one begins with a single theory—models of which
may be interpreted as corresponding to certain possible worlds—and constructs two further
(dual) theories therefrom. In that case, one is already in possession of a coherent account of
the physical equivalence of models of the two dual theories, in terms of the ontology of models
of the ‘quantum’ theory from which they are constructed.
If one follows this approach, then one may argue that the interpretational account of du-
alities is favoured over the motivational—for one may indeed interpret duality-related models
as being physically equivalent ab initio, via an explication of the ontology of their underly-
69Such an approach to dualities is also implicit in [40,41]. In these passages, by a “quantum system”, Polchin-
ski means a quantum theory; by two “classical limits”, he means two theories for which perturbation theory is
applicable, which may be defined from the original quantum theory—see [50, pp. 6ff.].
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ing ‘quantum’ theory. Note, however, that this is also consistent with the motivational ac-
count: since such an explication can be provided in every case, motivation for regarding the
duality-related models as being physically equivalent is automatically secured—so we are in-
deed warranted in doing so.
One may, however, question whether Polchinski’s account of dualities is most appropriate—
for it is not the case that we always construct dual theories from such an underlying theory.
For example, in the case of the AdS/CFT correspondence, neither the string theory in anti-de
Sitter space, nor the boundary conformal field theory, was constructed from a third, ‘quantum’
theory. Indeed, this is also true in the case of string-theoretic dualities: though certain dual
string theories are conjectured to be limits of an underlying so-called M-theory (introduced by
Witten in [81]), the existence of this theory was postulated post facto70—and it is not the case
that these string theories were initially defined therefrom. Nevertheless, there is overwhelming
evidence (in terms of matching of correlation functions, etc.; see e.g. [4,18]) that such theories
are dual, in the sense of §4.1.71
It is these cases—in which a duality between theories is discovered after the fact, and the
existence of an underlying, third theory is only conjectured—which are most interesting from
the point of view of the interpretational/motivational distinction. In such cases, we take it that
one needs to give a coherent account of the shared ontology (i.e. an appropriate interpreta-
tion) of duality-related models, before one declares those models to be physically equivalent;
moreover, there appears to exist no set of a priori principles by which one may deductively
infer that such an interpretation exists. For these reasons, we believe that (a) the definition
of duality presented in this paper is broader, more flexible, and more faithful to string theory
history than that proposed by Polchinski; and (b) that the right approach to such dualities is
the motivational approach.72
70The facto here being the construction of the two original, dual theories.
71Specifically, vis-a`-vis both their theoretical equivalence and their empirical equivalence.
72If one endorses these views, then one will argue that more needs to be done to demonstrate the physical
equivalence of duality-related models of certain string theories—in terms of exploring the mathematics and
interpretation of M-theory—before such physical equivalence can be declared by appeal to this (conjectured)
theory.
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5.3 Confident and Cautious Motivational Approaches
Other authors working in the foundations of quantum gravity—most notably De Haro—also
appear to endorse something akin to the motivational approach to dualities:
Duality in mathematics is a formal phenomenon: it does not deal with physically
interpreted structures ... But this is also how the term is used by physicists: it is
attached to the equivalence of the formal structures of the theories, regardless of
their interpretations, i.e. without it necessarily implying the physical equivalence
of the theories which describe two concrete systems. ...
Duality, then, is one of the ways in which two theories can be theoretically equiv-
alent, without its automatically implying their physical equivalence. [15, p. 9]
We concur with this verdict, though it is worth exploring further De Haro’s position. To
do so, first follow De Haro in distinguishing (i) ‘extendable’ and ‘unextendable’ theories—
i.e. “theories which do, respectively do not, admit suitable extensions in their domains of
applicability” [15, p. 4]—and (ii) ‘external’ and ‘internal’ interpretations of theories—i.e. “in-
terpretations which are obtained from outside (i.e. by coupling the theory to a second theory
which has already been interpreted), respectively from inside, the theory” [15, p. 4].73
De Haro argues that, since extendable theories may be coupled to further theories, they
should not be regarded as being physically equivalent.74 His reasoning here is motivated by
Galileo ship-type scenarios. To see this, consider the same physical system (e.g. the ship),
coupled to two further different physical systems (e.g. the shore at rest versus the shore in
motion)—we should (De Haro claims) not necessarily regard these two extendable models as
being physically equivalent tout court, in light of possible couplings to other physical systems
which suffice to reveal their physical distinctness. The same point applies to dual extendable
theories: though they are intertranslatable via the formal duality map, they should not be re-
garded as being physically equivalent, in light of possible further couplings to other physical
systems.
73For further details, see [15, §1]. Cf. also [21], in which a very similar distinction is drawn.
74For further discussion of these matters in the symmetries literature, see [29, 68]; cf. also footnote 16.
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Though we concur with De Haro on this point—indeed, ultimately we fully agree with De
Haro (and his close collaborator, Jeremy Butterfield) on these matters—it is worth reflecting
further upon his writings (and those of Butterfield), since doing so brings to light two different
sub-views within the motivational approach (viz., the confident and cautious versions of the
motivational approach, discussed in §§3.3 and 5.1). To this end, consider the following passage
from Butterfield: [9, p. 5]
... De Haro proposes a sufficient condition for one to be justified in interpreting
two duals to be physically equivalent. This sufficient condition has two conjuncts.
The first is that each dual is unextendable: which means, roughly speaking, that
the dual, i.e. the theory, both is a complete description of its intended domain
and cannot be extended to a larger domain. The second is that each dual has
an internal (as against external) interpretation: i.e. an interpretation that does not
proceed by coupling to another theory, often one which describes measurements
of the given theory’s domain. These conjuncts are linked in that De Haro argues
that unextendability implies that one is justified in using an internal interpreta-
tion: (justified but not obliged—there can still be external interpretations).
We fully agree with this passage. Indeed, Butterfield goes on to write that “a statement
of the bare theory, and an internal interpretation, are not automatic, given a proven dual-
ity” [9, p. 43], and to argue that (e.g.) Newton and Clarke were right not to move from New-
tonian mechanics formulated in Newtonian spacetime to Newtonian mechanics formulated in
Galilean (or Newton-Cartan) spacetime, as they did not have the relevant internal interpreta-
tion to hand (cf. [13, p. 854]). This resistance to ab initio declarations of physical equivalence
is, of course, very consonant with the motivational approach—to which, for such reasons, we
take Butterfield and De Haro to subscribe.
That said, the above, extended passage from Butterfield is ambiguous between a ‘confi-
dent’ version of motivationalism, according to which the internal interpretation on which dual
(unextendable) theories may be regarded as being physically equivalent always exists, and a
‘cautious’ version of motivationalism, according to which there is no guarantee that such an
internal interpretation exists. We take one of the central contributions of the present paper to
be the delineating of these distinct sub-views, hitherto overlooked in the literature.75
75We thank Jeremy Butterfield and Sebastian De Haro for discussion on these matters; in private communica-
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In our view, the cautious version of the motivational approach is to be preferred. Let us
explain why; we have, in particular, three points to make. First, it seems to us possible to
envisage (admittedly artificial) cases in which duality-related models do not possess suffi-
ciently rich common structure to afford a coherent physical interpretation: imagine that the
two models agree on empirical substructures, in addition to having extra structure, which is
not isomorphic between the two models. In that case, the only ‘common’ structures may be
the empirical substructures of both models—but the empirical substructures alone are insuffi-
cient for a realist understanding of what the mathematical model is supposed to represent in
the world.
Second, some philosophers, most notably Dasgupta, would maintain that we do not yet
have a coherent explication of the common ontology underlying models of Newtonian me-
chanics related by static shifts, or models of GR related by hole diffeomorphisms—for, Das-
gupta argues, standard responses such as sophisticated substantivalism make appeal to prob-
lematic “bare modal claims” [12, p. 120]; moreover, any alternative approach, such as an
appeal to so-called ‘Einstein algebras’ (cf. e.g. [25, ch. 9]), will face similar problems. In
such a case, for authors such as Dasgupta (who, incidentally, also endorses something like the
motivational approach to symmetries—cf. [13, pp. 853-854]), no such coherent explication of
the common ontology underlying the models in question is forthcoming; nor is it guaranteed
to exist. Thus, this particular case illustrates one of the ways in which one would be pushed
towards the more cautious motivational view.
Third and finally, our preferred version of the motivational approach is, we contend, the
most epistemically cautious interpretative attitude possible towards models of physical the-
ories related by symmetries/dualities.76 In our view, it is therefore unreasonable to demand
that the burden of justification lies with this position; rather, there exists a positive burden of
justification—here to argue that there always exists a coherent explication of the common on-
tology underlying symmetry- or duality-related models—for advocates of riskier approaches,
such as the confident motivational approach, or the interpretational approach.
tion, both have indicated that they favour the cautious motivational approach.
76There is some analogy here with van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism [71], often justified on the grounds
that “belief in the empirical adequacy of accepted theories [is] the weakest attitude one can attribute to scientists
at the same time that one is still able to make sense of their scientific activity” [47, §2.2].
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6 Consensus
In §1, we highlighted two oft-advanced reasons for regarding duality-related models as being
physically equivalent in the absence of a coherent explication of their common ontology: (1)
such a position—the interpretational approach to dualities—fits with the parallel interpreta-
tional approach to symmetries; (2) such a position accords with a perceived consensus in
contemporary theoretical physics. Up to this point, we have focussed on arguing against (1)—
by arguing against the interpretational approaches to both symmetries and dualities, and for
their motivational alternatives. In this section, we turn to (2), giving evidence that the inter-
pretational approach to dualities does not, in fact, represent a consensus in the relevant areas
of theoretical physics.
To begin, recall from §5.3 De Haro’s observation that, in physics, the term ‘duality’ “is
attached to the equivalence of the formal structures of the theories, regardless of their inter-
pretations” [15, p. 12]. That is, in theoretical physics the term ‘duality’ is often applied to
theories which are solely theoretically equivalent—physical equivalence notwithstanding. It
is not hard to identify explicit evidence for De Haro’s claim in the literature. For example,
Vafa defines a duality thus: [73, pp. 4-5]77
Consider a physical system Q (which I will not attempt to define). And suppose
this system depends on a number of parameters [λi]. Collectively we denote the
space of the parameters λi byM which is usually called the moduli space of cou-
pling constants of the theory. ... Typically physical systems have many observ-
ables which we could measure. Let us denote the observables by Oα. Then we
would be interested in their correlation functions ... The totality of such observ-
ables and their correlation functions determine a physical system. Two physical




are dual to one another if there is an isomor-
phism betweenM and M˜ and O ↔ O˜ respecting all the correlation functions.78
Vafa’s focus is clearly upon the formal, mathematical equivalence of the two theories in
77For philosophical discussions drawing upon Vafa’s definition of a duality, see [41, §3] and [59, §2].
78Here, by a ‘physical system’ Q, we can understand Vafa to mean a physical theory T ; one may then identify
Mwith our reduced space of DPMs, D˜ (note that the tilde here refers to the quotienting ofD by gauge-equivalent
models, rather than to the space of DPMs of the dual theory). By O, we understand Vafa to mean the set of
observables Oα for the theory in question.
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question (i.e. upon formal equivalence, in the sense of §4.1). If one understands correlation
functions as being the empirical substructures of the theories under consideration (in the sense
of [71, pp. 67ff.]), then one may be able to argue in addition that Vafa is interested in the
empirical equivalence of such theories. However, for our purposes the essential point here is
that no claim regarding the physical equivalence of duality-related models is advanced. This
accords with the view that, in the physics literature, the term ‘duality’ is often applied to cases
of theoretical equivalence, without (explicit) assumptions being made regarding the physical
equivalence of the models in question.
For a second piece of evidence to this end, consider the following quote from Maldacena
[38, p. 61], made in the context of the AdS/CFT correspondence:
What does it really mean for the two [dual] theories to be equivalent? First, for
every entity in one theory, the other theory has a counterpart. The entities may be
very different in how they are described by the theories: one entity in the interior
might be a single particle of some type, corresponding on the boundary to a whole
collection of particles of another type, considered as one entity. Second, the pre-
dictions for corresponding entities must be identical. Thus, if two particles have
a 40 percent chance of colliding in the interior, the two corresponding collections
of particles on the boundary should also have a 40 percent chance of colliding.
Maldacena is making two claims here. First, he is saying that, given two dual theories, every
entity in each theory has a ‘counterpart’ entity in the corresponding dual theory. Second, he is
saying that dual theories must be empirically equivalent. With regard to the first point: to say
that each such entity has a ‘counterpart’ in the corresponding dual theory is, of course, very
different from saying that they are truly one and the same thing. (The relation of counterpart-
hood is not the identity relation!) And with regard to the second point: empirical equivalence
is, of course, very different from physical equivalence. (Physical equivalence implies empiri-
cal equivalence, but not vice versa.)
To be clear, it is not our intention here to try to answer the (tricky) question of when exactly
physicists do and do not call an isomorphism between spaces of solutions a duality. Rather, our
purpose in this section is less ambitious: we seek merely to emphasise that physicists do not
invariably regard dual models as being physically equivalent, and (relatedly) that they do not
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invariably regard the notion of ‘duality’ as involving the notion of physical equivalence. To do
this, it is clearly not required that we get a grip on the question of when exactly physicists call
an isomorphism between spaces of solutions a ‘duality’—though we admit that this is indeed
an interesting question worthy of further scrutiny.
7 Close
In this paper, we have argued that it is not invariably legitimate to regard duality-related mod-
els as being physically equivalent; rather, the existence of a duality at most motivates one
to seek a coherent explication of the ontology underpinning their physical equivalence—and
only once such an explication is secured may one indeed take the models in question to be
physically equivalent. In order to achieve this goal, we have both (in §5) appealed to an
analogous distinction in the case of dualities to that between the interpretational and motiva-
tional approaches to symmetry transformations; and argued (in §6)—for what it is worth—that
physicists’ understanding of duality-related models vis-a`-vis their physical equivalence is less
clear-cut than some philosophers take it to be. The moral of our investigations is a familiar
one in the philosophy of physics: that the situation—here regarding dualities—is less straight-
forward than one might at first think. This paper may be judged a success to the extent that
the (in our view) over-simplified, false impression that duality-related models may always be
taken to represent the same physical state of affairs is dispelled.
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